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COMMENTS
EQUAL TREATMENT IN THE
ENFORCEMENT OF THE CRIMINAL LAW:
THE BAZELON-KATZENBACH LETTERS
One of the difficult and recurring problems in the administration of criminal justice is that of ensuring a continuing and meaningful dialogue between those persons, of whatever persuasion or philosophy, who occupy positions which enable them to significantly influence the course of the law.
Two such positions are those of the prosecutor and the appellate court judge. Ordinarily, however,
the mainstream of communication between them is the government's brief in the appellate court
and the responding collective opinion of the justices. As those versed in the intricacies of appellate
procedure know full well, the limitations of these documents as vehicles of expression are many. The
writer of the brief is bound to the facts of his case and he must, in addition, express the advocate's
position. The writer of the opinion has only slightly more freedom. True, he may stray from the complaint of the particular appellant before him to express individual views on the present and future
state of the law, but, in so doing, is likely to draw not only dissent from his brothers, but cries of
"dicta" from the lawyers and law reviewers.
During the summer of 1965, however, a most extraordinary exchange of correspondence, examining
the future course of the American criminal-constitutional law revolution, occurred between the
highest law enforcement officer of the nation, the Hon. Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Attorney General
of the United States, and the Hon. David L. Bazelon, Chief Judge of the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia. The Bazelon-Katzenbach letters, as they have come to be
known, gave fresh and imaginative consideration to some of the root problems of the criminal law now
undergoing intensive re-examination by groups of scholars, judges and legislators across the
country.
The letters were first published in full by the Washington, D.C. Evening Star on August 4, 1965,
and were given extensive, but only partial, quotation in much of the nation's press. Since we believe
that the Bazelon-Katzenbach letters constitute a significant contribution to the literature of this
"revolution," they are presented herewith in their entirety.-J. R. T.

Following is the fzdl text of an exchange between
Chief Judge David L.Bazelon of the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia and
Atty. Gen. Nicholas deB. Katzenbach expressing
divergent views on detainingand questioningsuspects
and other police procedures:
Dear Mr. Katzenbach:
In light of our recent discussions about the
administration of criminal justice, it was with
particular interest that I read your very fine
speech to the University of Chicago Alumni. You
have rightly pointed to the needs to examine how
theoretical legal rights work in practice and to
"re-evaluate the divergence of ideal and practice."
In line with this concern, I believe you may share
my misgivings about portions of Preliminary Draft
Number 1 of the proposed American Law Institute
Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure.
The Code proposes twenty-minute detention of
a citizen to "aid in the investigation or prevention

of a crime" and dragnet arrests where "it is likely
that only one or more but not all of the persons
arrested may be guilty of the crime." The Code
also approves police questioning of a suspect from
four to twenty-four hours after his arrival at a
police station. These provisions would, in my
experience, primarily affect the poor and, in
particular, the poor Negro citizen. I doubt that
police would, for example, arrest and question
the entire board of directors of a company suspected of criminal anti-trust violations although
it might be "likely that only one or more but not
all... may be guilty of a crime." It is not apparent
to me, however, that prosecuting authorities have
had notable success in detecting or combating
such "white collar crimes" as anti-trust violations
or tax frauds. I cannot understand why the crimes
of the poor are so much more damaging to society
as to warrant the current hue and cry-reflected
in the proposed Code--for enlarging police powers
which primarily are directed against those crimes.
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AVAILABILITY OF COUNSEL

It is also likely that, in some instances, professionals who engage in organized crime may be
held and questioned by police. But these suspects
know their rights and counsel is ordinarily available to them. Thus the discriminatory working of
the proposed Code is most graphically revealed in
the provisions regarding availability of counsel
during police interrogation.
The proposed Code permits a suspect to retain
counsel during interrogation but it deliberately
fails to provide counsel for those who cannot
afford it, or for those too ignorant or inexperienced
to understand their rights and their need for
counsel. The Code provides that retained counsel
may be present during police interrogation,
though the Reporter suggests, as an alternative
proposal, that retained counsel may be excluded
from the interrogation though he would be permitted to consult with his client prior to the
interrogation.
In the teeth of Gideon, Grilin, Coppedge and
Hardy, the Reporter's Commentary argues that
neither proposal regarding counsel works an invidious discrimination between rich and poor on
the ground that the state has no "affirmative
obligation to insure that persons in custody will not
incriminate themselves" but rather that the
"state must remain neutral." But the proposed
police detention and interrogation are not "neutral" state acts. Their primary effect, unless counsel
is provided, is to elicit damaging admissions from
suspects. (The Commentary suggests that detention and interrogation may also permit the
suspect to exculpate himself. But the presence of
counsel would aid rather than inhibit this purpose.)
If the state subjects all suspects to detention and
interrogation, it is only a pretense of "neutrality"
to permit those able to retain counsel to protect
their rights effectively while refusing to provide
equal protection to the poor and inexperienced.
ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL

The Code's alternative proposal-that retained
counsel be excluded from the interrogation-would
partially eliminate one blatant discrimination between rich and poor by impeding the ability of the
rich to protect their rights. But a major distinction
between rich and poor would remain: those who
could afford it would have some support from
counsel; the poor would have none.

In any event, elimination or curtailment of
counsel's role in the interrogation procedures
raises grave doubts about the fairness of those
procedures. The source of these doubts is revealed
in the Commentary's rationale for the Code's
refusal to appoint counsel during police interrogation: "The expenditure of large public funds is
not justified to assure that in all cases in-custody
interrogation can be effective only for purposes of
exculpation and never for inculpation." The clear
premise of this argument is that no one, if advised
by counsel, would volunteer inculpatory statements. Since the Commentary cannot assume that
counsel would coerce a suspect to remain silent, I
think this argument is an implicit admission that
counsel's presence militates against the confusion
or fear or insufficient understanding of his rights
which prompt a suspect to speak.
"ATmosPrERE OF CONFUSION"

Indeed, the Commentary itself admits that the
"atmosphere (of a police station) tends to be one of
confusion and indeterminacy" and it is, I think,
coercive to many who are accustomed to view the
police as hostile. In such atmosphere, the Code's
intricate provisions for police warning of rights
will be ineffective. Counsel, unlike the police, has
no transparent interest in eliciting self-incrimination, and he ordinarily is more detached and
knowledgeable than a relative who may, according
to the Code, be present, or consulted during interrogation. Since the Code refuses counsel to
those most likely to be detained and interrogated,
its claims ring hollow that "the suspect retains a
meaningful choice as to whether and how much
he will cooperate in the inquiry" and that it
"provide(s) equal access (for rich and poor?) to
sufficient information to make choice meaningful."
Moreover, these Code provisions fail to take
account of a vital consideration set out by the
Allen Committee in its "Report on Poverty and
the Administration of Federal Criminal Justice."
"The essence of the adversary system is challenge. The survival of our system of criminal
justice and the values which it advances depends
upon a constant, searching, and creative questioning of official decisions and assertions of authority
at all stages of the process. The proper performance of the defense function is thus as vital to the
health of the system as the performance of the
prosecuting and adjudicatory functions. It follows
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that insofar as the financial status of the accused
impedes vigorous and proper challenges, it constitutes a threat to the viability of the adversary
system."
The police interrogation procedure approved
by the Code requires "constant, searching, and
creative questioning" to insure its fairness and
even its compliance with the elaborate Code provisions. The Code's failure to see the need for
counsel "at all stages" of the criminal process is
at sharp variance with the philosophy of the
Criminal Justice Act of 1964, and with the Allen
Report and the policies of the Department of
Justice which led to that landmark act.
The proposed Code would in practice diverge
greatly from the ideal that the administration of
criminal justice should avoid invidious discrimination based on wealth. But the Code and the
Reporter's Commentary fail to follow your injunction in the University of Chicago speech:
that we must "admit what we are doing ...not

merely for the sake of symmetry, but for the sake
of social honesty, and, indeed, for the sake of
better controlling crime."
I hope you share my concern, and I welcome
your comments in the same spirit of openminded
investigation which characterized your University
of Chicago speech and our recent conversations.
Unless you see some objections, I would like
to furnish a copy of this letter to some of those
with whom I have discussed this problem from
time to time and to the interested people at the
American Law Institute.
DAVID L. BAZELON
KATZENBACH'S ANSWER
Dear Judge Bazelon:
The kind references in your recent letter to my
remarks in Chicago were most gratifying. I am
happy you agree that we cannot continue public
discussion of problems in the administration of
the criminal law without recognizing our actual
practices and inquiring into the reasons for them.
A viable resolution of the issues we face is indeed
possible only if we pull all the considerations
into the open and honestly attempt to balance
the competing goals of our society.
The underlying assumption of your approach
appears to be some conception of equality. No
one, of course, would argue with "equal justice
under law" or any other formulation. Nor do I
propose to argue that purely formal conceptions

[Vol. 56

of equality may have unequal impact in law as
they do in virtually every aspect of our life. The
poor are disadvantaged in many ways as against
the rich; the ignorant as against the educated;
the sick as against the healthy, etc. To what
extent and by what means legal processes should
take into account such inequalities raises difficult
questions. I would suppose the answers, insofar
as we can discover them, lie in other values which
are sought within our system. It would be ridiculous to state that the overriding purpose of any
criminal investigation is to insure equal treatment.
Obviously, criminal investigation is designed to
discover those guilty of crime. We limit both
investigation and criminal prosecution in various
ways both to protect the innocent and the personal rights (for example, privacy, freedom of
movement and speech) we enjoy in our society.
It is entirely proper to limit what the police may
do in the course of an investigation, even if those
limitations result in some of the guilty avoiding
conviction. For example, we do not permit confessions to be tortured or beaten out of people,
rich or poor-not because such confessions are
necessarily unreliable but because these things are
incompatible with decent law enforcement, and
because-inevitably-the rack would be used on
the innocent as well as the guilty. All this is
obvious. But what may be forgotten is that each
such decision to impose a limitation involves a
balance of the values thus promoted against the
value of discovering those guilty of crime.
NOT A WELFARE PROGRAM

In recent years we have taken steps to make
the process fairer to the poor-by providing
counsel, by revising bail procedures, etc. But in
none of these efforts has equality been our overriding objective-nor should it be. We provide
counsel in order to insure that the innocent are
not wrongly convicted, that they may raise defenses which help preserve the integrity of the
judicial process. We do it for our sake, not for
theirs. And we are providing bail procedures because we believe that in many instances financial
condition is irrelevant to the purposes sought to
be promoted by bail. Again, it is not a welfare
program, but one designed to better effectuate the
purpose of bail.
In short, I do not believe that regulation through
judicial decision or statute of investigatory procedures should have as its purpose to remedy all
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the inequalities which may exist in our society as
a result of social and economic and intellectual
differences to the exclusion of all other purposes
and values sought to be achieved in the criminal
process. I do not believe that any decision of the
Supreme Court, nor of any court of appeals, has
been explicitly based on such a premise of equality.
The courts have been attempting, in the cases
before them, the same difficult balance of goals,
a balance all the more difficult for lack of an adequate public and legislative discussion of the issues.
In general, over the past quarter century, ap
pellate decisions marking off broad new areas of
reform in criminal procedure have gained public
acceptance and the full support of law enforcement officers, prosecutors, and judges alike. But
as the cases have presented more and more difficult
questions of fairness and propriety, I believe the
judges have left the public behind, and, even
among judges, the margins of the consensus have
been passed. The most basic investigatory methods
have come to be questioned in the contest of
specific cases and unique factual situations, rather
than after review of all of the considerations which
might be thought relevant in designing rules for
the system as a whole. As a result, policemen,
district attorneys, and trial court judges have
become increasingly unsure of the law with respect
to arrest and post-arrest procedures, often differing vigorously among themselves. In your own
court of appeals, the result is too often determined
by the particular panel which hears a case. Thus
the consistency, the efficiency, and consequently
the fairness of justice have suffered.
SUGGESTION 'IRRELEVANT'

Your suggestion that police questioning will
primarily affect the poor and, in particular, the
poor Negro, strikes me as particularly irrelevant.
The simple fact is that poverty is often a breeding
ground for criminal conduct and that inevitably
any code of procedure is likely to affect more poor
people than rich people. For reasons beyond their
control, in Washington many poor people are
Negroes; in Texas, Mexicans; in New York City,
Puerto Ricans. A system designed to subject
criminal offenders to sanctions is not aimed against
Negroes, Mexicans, or Puerto Ricans in those
jurisdictions simply because it may affect them
more than other members of the community.
There are, of course, inequities in our society
resulting from differences in wealth, education,

and background, and these inequities are sometimes reflected in the outcome of the criminal
process. Poverty, ignorance, and instability produced by wretched living conditions may make
an individual's criminal acts more susceptible to
discovery and proof. But I am sure you will agree
these same conditions are major causes of crime.
So long as they exist and lead an individual to
victimize his fellow citizens, government cannot
and should not ignore their effects during a criminal investigation. Otherwise, so many persons
guilty of crime would be insulated from conviction
that our system of prevention and deterrence
would be crippled.
This would in fact increase the suffering of the
less favored in our society, for it is they who live
in the high-crime areas and they who are the usual
victims of crime. Investigation is not a game. It
is a deadly serious public responsibility, whatever
the crime. Losses and injuries which may appear
small are often crushing to the victims involved.
We are not so civilized that we can afford to
abandon deterrence as a goal of our criminal law.
Thwarting detection and prosecution would also
close the door to the rehabilitative correctional
system, which is appropriately designed to ameliorate the effects of social injustice.
AcQUITTAL o

THE GUILTY

Indeed, it is questionable whether similarity of
outcome is even relevant to the design of a process
which seeks to separate out the innocent before
charge and to make possible the trial of those who
appear guilty. The elimination of disabling discrimination is the primary goal of the Poverty
Program, the Civil Rights Act, and numerous
and expanding services in vocational rehabilitation, school assistance, and medical care. It is
one of the goals of the Criminal Justice Act, which
recognizes that counsel make a positive and essential contribution to the further separation of
the innocent from the guilty in adversary proceedings and to appropriate dispositions. Society
gains in all these. But absolute equality of result
could be achieved in the investigatory stageafter a crime has been committed and before a
trial is possible-only by deliberately foregoing
reliable evidence and releasing guilty men. Acquittal of the guilty does not promote social justice.
Moreover, acquittal of the guilty in the name
of equality of treatment may prevent our achieving
other, more fundamental goals also contained in
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the ideal of equal justice. Fairness is owed to
those who obey the law, and to those guilty who
are convicted. Many undergo hardship and
rigorous self-discipline while observing the restraints of the law, and are unjustly disadvantaged
if some are permitted to break the law with impunity. And to a man convicted because he was
careless in leaving a fingerprint, or too poor to
change his tell-tale clothes after a crime, there is
no more galling governmental act than the release
of one who betrayed himself because he was careless in answering a question. Furthermore, in the
elimination of questioning a high price would be
paid by the innocent who are exculpated early
in the criminal process by police questioning, and
by those who appear at first to deserve a more
serious charge than is eventually filed after questioning. The introduction of counsel at this early
stage would not, as you suggest, promote this
screening, for there must be the possibility of an
incriminating as well as an exculpatory outcome
if there is to be imaginative and energetic investigatory questioning.
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spectability at stake, and who could have a
lawyer at their command, cannot afford to appear
guilty. Calling a lawyer for protection from investigation, or refusing to answer questions, does often
give the appearance of guilt, and as a consequence
the rich will often talk, and, if guilty, will often
provide incriminating evidence.
You are right, I fear that "professionals who
engage in organized crime" frequently succeed in
avoiding conviction under our system. But I
have never understood why the gangster should
be made the model and all others raised, in the
name of equality, to his level of success in suppressing evidence. This is simply the proposition
that if some can beat the rap, all must beat the
rap. I see no reason to distort the whole of the
criminal process in this fashion. Because we cannot solve all crimes and convict all criminals is no
reason to release those guilty whom we can convict.
Discussions such as ours, now stimulated by
the American Law Institute's draft code, are being
generally undertaken with regard to the design of
our whole system of criminal law. My chief conSrmLY NOT COMPARABLE
cern is that in seeking to achieve the freedom,
The interests are subtle and complex. When security, legal and social justice that are at stake
analyzing our system in terms of the concept of in our conclusions, we do not permit the real issues
equality, it seems to me wholly arbitrary to choose to be obscured. If the issue is conviction of the
as groups for comparison only some of the poor innocent, then we must specifically examine that.
guilty and some of the rich guilty.
If it is the coercion of the socially disadvantaged,
In any event, I do not think the dissimilarities then we must discuss that carefully and realin outcome for rich and poor are so great as you istically. If it is the meaning of the privilege
suggest. The failure to arrest a Board of Directors against self-incrimination, or the likely effect and
for questioning about an antitrust violation does proper function of counsel, then we must turn to
not strike me as an example of unequal treatment. that on its merits. But we cannot afford merely
The investigations of antitrust violations and of to draw out the logic of unexamined assumptions.
violent urban crime are simply not comparable, The stakes are too high.
and the anonymity and mobility of modern urban
I have no objection, of course, to your releasing
life often do not permit postponement of arrest
your letter to anyone you wish, and should you
when crimes of violence are involved. -Moreover, desire you may append this reply to it.
when any crime is in issue those who have reNICHOLAS DEB. KATZENBACH

